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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KEITH E. SOHM, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
WENDELL D . WINEGAR , d ba 








STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
CASE NO. 14654 
The plaintiff in this action is an attorney duly licensed 
to practice law in the courts of this state. The defendant, Wendell D. 
Winegar, is an individual doing business as Utah Electric and Motor Co., 
a business which involves the sale and repair of electric motors and 
related supplies. The plaintiff has been performing legal services for 
defendant for about 20 years, during all of which time the parties were 
personal friends and they performed services for each other on a very 
informal basis (R.95). No formal written attorney retainer agreement 
was ever drawn up between the parties (R. 116) but traditionally throughout 
their association the plaintiff had charged and defendant had paid one-
fourth of the recovery in collection cases except that it may have been 
one-half in small collections. (R. 60, 107). Plaintiff obtained a 
judgement for $9,706 against All Grain for defendant and received attorneys 
based on one-fourth from February 24, 1973 until October 4, 1973 at about 
which time defendant by-passed the plaintiff, settled directly with All 
Grain and thereafter ignored the plaintiff's billing for the balance due 
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on attorneys fees, Defendant also failed to pay attorney's fees on the 
Rothe Estate matter and a small balance due in the Flint and Walling Case, 
After October, 1973 and throughout 1974 the defendant failed 
to respond to the billings of the plaintiff - he never refused to pay, he 
just wouldn't respond (Exhibit 14-P). The plaintiff claims the following 
amounts are reasonable and are due on the following accounts with defendant 
including interest to May 10, 1976, (Exhibit 1-P), to wits 
First Cause of Action - Taylor, All Grain and G.E. acct. 
Second Cause of Action - Rothe Estate Account . . 
Third Cause of Action - Flint and Walling Account 
TOTAL DUE 
DISPOSITION BY THE COURT 
$624,26 
474.07 
• 56 .oo 
$1 1 I'3II:93 
The lower court denied recovery by the plaintiff on any of the 
three causes of action finding that the plaintiff had received a reasonable 
fee for his services. 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY APPEAL 
The plaintiff seeks to have the order of the lower courts 
reversed, to find that there was, in fact, a fee arrangement of one-fourth 
of the recovery in effect between the parties and that for the sum of 
$1,154.93 plus costs and interest, the plaintiff is entitled to judgement. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
First Cause of Action: The plaintiff, at the request of 
defendant and after preliminary demands filed an action in the Third Judicial 
District Court for Salt Lake County, known as Utah Electric and Motor Co. 
vs, Lawrence C, Taylor and All Grain Co,, Civil No. 205125. After 
participating in some preliminary motions which were won by plaintiff for 
Utah Electric, the plaintiff moved for a Summary Judgement against All 
Grain Co, and the Judgement was granted December 21, 1972 in total amount 
of $9,706.36 plus costs (R. 58, Ex. 2-P). Because the corporation refused 
to pay the judgement plaintiff proceeded to press for trial against Mr. Taylor 
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personally. When the trial date of February 27, 1973 drew near (Exhibit 17-P) 
plaintiff so advised Mr. Winegar by his notes of December 21, 1972 and 
February 16, 1973 (Exhibit 3-P) and urged Taylor and All Grain to Settle, 
Mr. Taylor and All Grain agreed to pay the judgement at the rate of $1,000 
per month (R. 58) so trial was deferred and All Grain started making payments 
February 24, 1973 on a total amount including interest of $9,868,06, 
Plaintiff received the monthly payments, computed the interest, distributed 
the funds and sent a copy of his accounting to the defendant and the All 
Grain attorney each time payment was received (R, 58, 59) (Exhibit 2-P, 
p-4). Checks were received and disbursed (without showing cents) as follows: 
Payment To To Interest Principal Balance 
Keith Wen 
2-24-73 $1,000 $1,000 $130 $870 $9,868 
3-24-73 1,000 1,000 51 942 8,868 
4-26-73 1,000 1,000 52 947 7,925 
6-20-73 2,000 250 1,750 93 1,906 6,978 
8-15-73 1,000 250 750 50 949 4,121 
9-o6-73 1,000 1,000 20 979 3,142 
10-4-73 1,000 500 500 21 979 2,163 
$8,000 $2,000 $6,000 BALANCE DUE $2,163 
The defendant acknowledged in this answer (Exhibit 2-P p, 3,4, & 5) 
that he received $6,000 and plaintiff received $2,000 up to October 4, 1973 
and thereafter defendant received$1,958 (R. 10). 
No chamges were assessed by plaintiff for collecting, accounting 
and mailing services, Up to October, 1973 plaintiff had received one-fourth 
of each $1,000 payment. The first $1,000 was held out by plaintiff and 
plaintiff held out $500 from the last payment, The defendant paid $250 in 
June and $250 in August in response to billings. 
The defendant gave his permission for plaintiff to keep the first 
check (R. 101) (Exhibit 2-P). The defendant was anxious to get the rest of his 
money and began calling All Grain and making demands and finally without 
consulting plaintiff arranged a settlement of $1,958, by-passed the plaintiff 
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and collected the $1,958 directly from the All Grain people on about 
October 18, 1973 (R. 10, 59, 60). The first time plaintiff knew of the 
settlement was when All Grain attorney asked for a satisfaction of 
judgement (R. 60 Ex. 2-P p. 2). Plaintiff repeatedly billed defendant for 
one-fourth of $1,958 or $489.50 (Ex. 2-P, 3-P and 4-P). In one instance 
April 17, 1974 plaintiff billed defendant for one-third (Ex. 3-P p. 5) but 
corrected it later. By letter of August 9, 1974 (Ex. 2-P p. 8) Winegar's 
secretary wrote obviously objecting to the one-third but no objection was ever 
made to the billing for one-fourth until an answer was filed to this complaint, , 
The defendant refused to answer plaintiff's billing, telephone 
calls and even evaded plaintiff when he came to his office but the defendant 
never once objected to plaintiff's bills and never paid it (R. 60, 62, 63). 
Plaintiff is now claiming one-fourth of $2,163.00 (Ex 1-P) since defendant 
refused to pay the lesser amount and since he by-passed his attorney in settling\ 
and did so without plaintiff's permission. 
The Second Cause of Action involves the bill of the plaintiff in 
the matter of the Rothe Estate, On or about February 19, 1975, plaintiff 
received an offer to settle defendant's claim against the Kurt P. Rothe estate 
i 
defendant ! in Wasatch County which claim plaintiff had filed and handled for the 
some 13 years before. After interviews, research and preparation and two or I 
three appearances arguing motions in the Wasatch County Probate Court, no 
recovery was made, The Court appearances and negotiations covered a period 
between October 29, 1962 and July 27, 1964. The Court appearances were 
October 29, 1962, December 13, 1962 and July 27, 1964 (Ex. 4-P). The plaintiff 
1 
received about $50.00 for his services (R. 81). By notice (Ex. 5-P) plaintiff 
was advised the Estate would settle for $1,780.57. Plaintiff personally 
advised the defendant who accepted the settlement offer. The acceptance was 
_____ relayed to the Estate's attorney, The check for $1,780.57 was sent to 
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plaintiff April 17, 1975 made out to Wendell D. Winegar (Ex. 4-P). Because 
of the difficulty in ~etting his fees in the All Grain case, plaintiff added 
his name to the check and left it with defendant rather than holding it 
until defendant signed it. The $1,780,57 represented an unexpected windfall 
since both plaintiff and defendant had written the debt off years before 
(R. 86). Plaintiff billed defendant for his usual one-fourth fee by his 
bill of April 28, 1975 (Ex. 4-P). Defendant ignored the bill, failed to 
pay it but did not object to it at anytime, 
The Third Cause of Action involves the bill of the plaintiff for 
$50,00 in the Flint and Walling Case where defendant was sued as a defendant 
so charges were based on an hourly rate, The last check received by the 
plaintiff from the defendant for services in this case was for $455.00 
(Ex. 6-P and 11-D) which paid plaintiff up to the time a settlement was 
entered into on the case on about May 10, 1973. The additional $50 charge 
resulted from further negotiations and letters with Flint and Walling when 
defendant failed to make payments to Flint and Walling as agreed. The 
$50 represents a very conservative two hours even though prior billing had 
been Oilled $35 an hour (Exhibit 6-P). The last services were performed 
in July and August 1974 (R. 65, 66 Exhibit 6-P). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRORED IN NOT ALLOWING PLAINTIFF ATI'ORNEY'S FEES ON THE 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION. THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY ESTABLISHES THAT PLAINTIFF 
WAS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE-FOURTH OF THE TOTAL 
RECOVERED FROM THE JUDGEMENT OBTAINED BY PLAINTIFF FOR DEFENDANT AGAINST 
ALL GRAIN COMPANY. 
As evidence that plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fee of 
one-fourth of the amount of the judgement the plaintiff claims as follows: 
1, The plaintiff performed services for the defendant for many 
years without a written agreement. The fee arrangement had always been 
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one-fourth of recovery in collection cases (R. 62, 64). (Many attorneys, 
of course, charge one-third or more). 
2. In plaintiff's letter of August 21, 1972 he offered to 
work for an hourly fee or for a fee of one-third and asked defendant to 
respond but no answer was received (R. 61, Ex. 3-P p. 1). Plaintiff's next 
letter dated December 21, 1972 stated, "I will pursue the matter on a 
contingent basis with a minimum as suggested in one of my previous letters" 
(R. 61, Ex. 3-P p. 2). On February 16, 1973, plaintiff advised defendant, 
"I will figure attorney's fees on a contingent basis in the Taylor matter." 
(Ex 8-d). NO OBJEI:TION WAS MADE BY DEFENDANT TO THESE CONTINGENT FEE 
PROPOSALS. Based on these pre-recovery proposals plaintiff could have charg~ 
a one-third fee but decided one-fourth was adequate. It is obvious that 
defendant never responded or plaintiff would not have kept sending notes, 
3. Plaintiff commenced collection of the judgement on February 24, 
1973 and continued to collect for defendant at the rate of $1,000 per month 
through October 4, 1973 withholding his one-fourth fee in some cases but 
remitting the check and billing in other cases (Ex. 2-P) (Ex. 3-P p. 4). 
The defendant paid one $250 bill in June and another one-fourth fee with hls 
check No. 1151 dated August 15, 1973 (Ex. 13-D) showing his agreement to the 
one-fourth fee terms. ~ plaintiff collected his $250 fee from February 
through October WITHOUT AN OBJECTION FROM THE DEFENDANT. In fact, defendant 
never objected to the fee arrangement until he answered the complaint in 
June, 1975. 
4. Defendant acknowledged the one-fourth fee arrangement when 
he stated in his answer to the Complaint: "4, Pursuant to the a=angement for 
payment, the plaintiff received a check on or about February 24, 1973, and 
deducted from the $1,000 received $250.00," (R. 10). 
5. Defendant failed to pay the one-fourth attorney fee only when 
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he improperly settled directly with the All Grain people, by-passed plaintiff 
(his attorney) collected the last payment and conveniently forgot his attorney 
(R. 59). 
6. On two instances, November, 1973 and April, 1974, the plaintiff 
by error, billed the defendant for one-third (Ex. 3-P, 9-D, 10-D), The 
defendant's office girl answered one of these billings by letter of 
August 9, 1974 "per All Grain Matter. Your amount is incorrect" (Ex. 2-P 
p. 3) but never objected to the billings for one-fourth fee (R. 62). This 
office letter was the closestdefendant ever came to objecting to anything. 
Defendant could not have been very angry at plaintiff as of August 9, 1974 
because he requested further services. 
7. When defendant continued to ignore plaintiff for over a year, 
plaintiff did everything possible, phoning, writing and even going to 
defendant's place of business trying to collect or get some explanation from 
Mr. Winegar but Winegar refused to answer calls and even had his office 
lie for him (R. 62, 63). Even after his office's letter of August 9, 1974 
(Ex. 2-P) saying Winegar wanted to discuss with me the defendant refused to 
contact me or answer my calls. Plaintiff's frustration is shown by his 
letter of May 12, 1975 demanding some kind of response from defendant to 
no avail (Ex. 14-P). OBVIOUSLY UP TO MAY 12, 1975 DEFENDANT STILL HAD NOT 
OBJECTED TO THE ONE-FOURTH FEE, it wasn't until after that last desperate 
letter went unanswered that an action was filed by the plaintiff. 
On cross examination defendant stated: 
Mr. Sohm: Q, "And you never did object to the fee I had put 
on those bills of one-fourth, did you?" 
Mr. Winegar: A, "I don't believe that is a fair question." 
OBVIOUSLY THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT OR, AT LEAST, DEFENDANT IS 
ESTOPPED FROM DENYING HE WAS OBLIGATED TO PAY ATTORNEY'S FEES BASED ON 
ONE-FOURTH OF THE JUDGEMENT. The defendant's gripe seems to be that he did 
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not get good collection service (R, 10) but by that time the fee was 
already earned and often attorney's charge extra for collecting which 
plaintiff did not expect to do, Anyhow, plaintiff could never understand 
defendants impatience since checks came in regularly February, March, April 
etc, 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE A'ITORNEY' S FEE BASED ON THE BALANCE DUE - ONE-FOURTH 
OF $2,163,00 OR $540,80 AND NOT ON THE AMOUNT OF $1,958.00 REJ::EIVED BY 
DEFENDANT SINCE IT WAS AN IMPROPER SE'ITLEMENT AND PLAINTIFF REJ::EIVED ONLY IV'c• 
rvor $2,500 AS LATER CLAIMED BY DEFENDANT. 
Plaintiff had collected regularly and reasonably on schedule 
and a balance of $2,163 was due from All Grain to plaintiff and defendant 
(Ex. 2-P p. 5) when defendant improperly and without permission of plaintiff 
settled for $1,958 and collected that sum directly from All Grain with 
intent of beating plaintiff out of his fees, 
The defendant admitted plaintiff had received only $2,000 in his 
answer (R, 10) but at trial to the complete surprise of plaintiff came up for 
the first time with a claim he had paid plaintiff $2,500 and offered 
Exhibit 13-D which plaintiff objected to (R. 9) and testified he had not 
received $1,000 on August 9th, The August 9th entry has been obviously 
erased and changed, the last total entry in that column has also been erased 
The proper entry on the August 9th line should be $250 or possible $500, nof 
$1,000, The August 9th entry is obviously the check No, 1151 dated 
August 15, 1973 at the bottom of Exhibit 13-D (R, 91), This was the only 
payment made by defendant to plaintiff and was made in response to plaintiff 
bill June 20, 1973 (Ex, 3-P p. 4), No checks were produced and a so-called 
check 1395 dated 12-9-73 for $200 was denied, and obviously has nothing to 
do with this proceeding. A $100 payment received by plaintiff shown in 
Exhibit 7-D was applied to services in the General Electric matter referred 
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in the record p, 77 and p. 117. That $100 was the only fee received in the 
G. E. matter. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT ERRORED IN NOT ALLOWING PLAINTIFF ATTORNEYS FEES ON 
THE SEX:OND CAUSE OF ACTION. THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWS PLAINTIFF IS 
ENTITLED TO ONE-FOURTH OF THE SUM OF $1,780,57 ( $445,14) FOR ATTORNEY • S 
FEES IN ROTHE ESTATE COLLEX:TION, 
About 13 years ago plaintiff represented defendant in filing 
a claim against the Estate of Kurt P. Rothe in Wasatch County, (R. 63, Ex. 
2-P and 4-P), The plaintiff made at least two or three appearances in 
Heber City on the matter over a couple of years period (Ex, 4-P). Both 
plaintiff and defendant had given up and written the claim off, In February 
1975 plaintiff received a notice (Ex, 5-P) offering defendant 80% or 
$1,780,57 to settle his claims. Plaintiff contacted defendant and defendant 
agreed to the settlement (R, 64), Attorney's fees were not discussed but 
plaintiff received the checks (Ex, 4-P) added his name to it because of his 
difficulty recovering other fees and delivered the check to defendant and 
billed the defendant for $445.14 (R. 64, Ex. 4-P), The plaintiff is 
entitled to attorney's fees based on one-fourth of the recovery because of 
the past practices between the parties of using one-fourth as the attorney's 
fee in collection matters as observed by the court, "He is going on the 
basis, I assume, that his regular fee had been one-fourth of what he 
collected, on this basis," (R, 63). In past practices charges were based 
on one-fourth of the recovery as attorneys fees (R, 60), It was also the 
fee that had applied in the All Grain case without objection (R. 62) as 
discussed above, The defendant was billed April 28, 1975 for the sum of 
$445.14 (Ex. 4-P) right after the check for $1,780,57 was delivered by 
plaintiff to defendant, No payment was made by defendant and no objection 
was ever received to the billing charge of one-fourth of the recovery despite 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-10-
repeated demands by plaintiff. That no objections were received to the 
billing is shown by the des-pa.ration letter of plaintiff dated May 12, 1975 
(Ex. 14-P). 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRORED IN NOT ALLOWING PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY'S FEE OF $50.00 IN 
THE THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE FLINT AND WALLING MATTER. THE UNDISPUTED 
EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWS THE PLAINTIFF PERFORMED ADDITIONAL SERVICES FOR 
DEFENDANT FOR OVER TWO HOURS REASONABLY WORTH $50.00. 
The plaintiff was paid a check for $455.00 for his services as 
shown on the page of Exhi b1 t 6-P and page two of that exhibit shows two hours 
additional services billed as $50 (Ex. 4-P) which was never paid (R. 65). 
The services were made necessary when defendant failed to pay Flint and 
Walling as agreed. Winegar was trying to stall for time and asked me to 
try to stall them off (R. 67, 68). I wrote to defendant August 7, 1974 
enclosing a statement and an affidavit regarding default in the Flint and 
Walling Matter (Ex. 2-P p. 8). Defendant's office girl wrote back August 9, 
1974 stating: 
"With regard to the letter from Mr. Greenwood informing 
us that arrangements are to be made to pay the amount due, would 
you kindly inform him of the followings We do expect payment 
in the next two weeks from two or three large contracts for 
which we have received materials to complete, and we would 
offer $5,500,00 by the 24th of August, approximately, with 
the balance in three payments w1 thin ninety days. If this does 
not satisfy the plaintiff, then we would ask your indulgence in 
defending us to this end, as we can only perform to this extent", 
Obviously considerable extra services were performed and requeste 
by defendant after the payment of $455.00 on June 22, 1973. The $50 fee was 
properly char~ed, well earned, never paid and never objected to. 
The defendant stated several times that he was able to and would 
pay reasonable fees. (R. 94, 105)and did not contest the additional Flint 
a.Jil. Walling bill (R. 104, 105). 
POINT V 
A CONTINGENT FEE OF ONE-FOURTH IS AN ACCEPTABLE FEE AND IS REASONABLE. 
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Contingent fee arrangements have long been an accepted and 
are a very common method of applying attorney's fee, In 4A Pacific Digest 
2nd Sections 147, 148 (1) 148 (2) and 148 (3) several pages refer to 
contingent fees and none of the many citations appeared critical of the 
contingent fee but discussed various problems connected with its application, 
A contingent fee contract was upheld in the following California 
case when the court had to consider the circumstances surrounding the matter 
to determine the parties intent, Houge v, Ford, 285 P 2d 257. 
"Contingent fee contract between attorney and client, 
when explained by reference to circumstances under which it 
was made and matter to which it relates, left no doubt as to 
its meaning, and statute providing that any possible doubts as 
to meaning of contract should be resolved against person 
preparing it was not applicable," 
Priester v, Citizens Nat, Trust & Saving Bank 280 P 2d 835: 
"Contract between attorney and client for the rendition 
of services construed as a whole, manifested the intent that 
one-fourth interest in all the properties described which 
were all the properties belonging to plaintiff would be 
the fee of the attorney if he were successful in defending 
plaintiff in an action brought against him by his mother to 
recover an apartment house," 
The Utah Case, Petrie v, General Contracting Co,, 17 U 2 408, 
413 P 2d 600, involved a client's action against an attorney who claimed 
a one-third interest in mining claims, The Supreme Court upheld the lower 
court in finding the client and attorney intended that the attorney was to 
receive a contingent fee of one-third of whatever was obtained from 
defendant, The court further held that: 
"There is no question about the validity of a contract 
for an attorney's fee contingent upon recovery, which may 
be a share of it; nor that the same rules apply to it as to 
other contracts. Both the amount and the means of payment, 
whether in money or property, depend upon the agreement between 
the parties, In the event of uncertainty or ambiguity as to 
their intent, it may be divined from their conduct and the 
surrounding circumstances," 
Clearly the Utah case hold the Court can consider the intent from 
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surrounding circumstances and conduct of the parties. Obviously in our 
case judging from past practices and the fact that attorney's fees were 
received based on twenty five percent over a nine month period without 
objection shows an agreement of the defendant to the one-fourth fee as well 
as an agreement on the reasonableness. If the courts found one-third 
reasonable in the above case certainly the arrangement between plaintiff 
and defendant for one-fourth was reasonable, The court goes on to observe 
that a client has a duty to be honest with his attorney as well as the 
lawyer to his client: 
"In the circumstances here shown the fact that Mr. Tuft 
was plaintiff's attorney in the prior action gives him no 
less rights than any other associate would have had who had 
been assigned one-third of "whatever was obtained from the 
defendant." We are constantly hearing talk about the 
obligations of lawyers to be honest with their clients, which 
is correct and salutary. But it is also true that a client 
has a duty to be honest with his lawyer and that the latter • s 
rights are equally entitled to be safeguarded by the courts." 
"We are in accord with the view of the trial court that 
the reasonable deduction from the facts shown is that the 
parties intended that Mr. Tuft was to receive a contingent fee 
of one-third of whatever was obtained from the defendant, 
whether money or property, •• ,", 
Section 78-51-41, Utah Code Annotated 1953, states: 
"The compensation of an attorney and counselor for his 
services is governed by agreement, express or implied, which 
is not restrained by law. From the commencement of an 
action or the service of an answer containing a counter-
claim, the attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon 
his client's cause of action or counterclaim, which attaches to 
a verdict, report, decision or judgement in his client's favor 
and to the proceeds thereof in whosoever hands they may come, and 
cannot be affected by any settlement between the parties before 
or after judgement". 
In the Utah Case, Bishop v, Parker, 103 Ut. 145, 134 P 2d 180, 
the Court held that compensation is governed by agreement, express or implioo 
and is not restrained by law. 
The Jones v, rartin California Case, 256 P 2d 905 held that 
a contingent fee agreement vests attorney with an equitable interest in the 
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clients cause of action and a trust is created in the recovery for 
benefit of the attorney and that: 
"neither client nor opposite party, if latter has 
knowledge of attorney's rights, can so compromise 
litigated subject matter as to defeat attorney's rights." 
In Rader v, Thrasher, California, 368 P2d 360 the Court 
held a contingent fee contract may properly provide for larger compensation 
than would otherwise be reasonable, 
as follows: 
A 1962 California case Setzer v, Robinson, 368 P2d 124, held 
"Contingent fee agreement was not unconscionable 
where it provided for fee of one-third of recovery, w1 th 
retainer paid at outset credited upon such one-third, even though 
defendant in case for which attorney was retained defaulted, in 
view of fact that parties could not tell in advance that 
default would occur and services might have included contested 
trial and possible appeal," 
"Reasonableness of contingent fee is to be judged not 
by hindsight but by situation as it appeared to parties at time 
contract was entered into". 
7 Am Jur 2nd ~ 214 states: 
"Contingent fee contracts between attorney and client are 
recognized as valid unless obtained by fraud, mistake, undue 
influence, or suppression of facts on the part of the attorney, 
or unless the contract is contrary to public policy". 
"§ 223 - The client cannot by settling, compromising, or 
dismissing a pending suit or action, without consent or over 
the objection of his attorney, deprive the attorney of compen-
sation which the client agreed to pay." 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays the lower court be reversed and 
Judgement be allowed for the plaintiff against the defendant, 
Dated this 3rd day of January, 1977. 
Respectfully Submitted 
Keith E, Sohm 
Suite 81 Trolley Square 
Salt lake City, Utah 84102 
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Mailed a copy to counsel for defendant, Roger F. Cutler, 
602 East Third South, Salt Lake City, Utah this 4th day of January, 1977. 
Keith E. Sohm 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
